ABSTRACT Vector-bome diseases such as malaria, dengue, and leishmaniasis are a threal to military forces deployed outside of ihe United States. The availability of specific information on the vector-borne disease threat (e.g.. presence or absence of a specific disease agenl, temporal and get)graphic dislributiim of competent vectors, and vector infecfion rales) allows lor effeclive implementation oí appropriate measures to prolccl our deployed military forces. Vector diagnostics can provide critical, rcal-lime information crucial to esiablii.hing effective vector prevention/control programs. In this article we provide an overview of current vector diagnostic capabilities, evaluate the use of vector diagnostics in Operation Rndiiring Freedom and Operatit>n Iraqi Freedom, and discuss the ct>ncept of operations under which vector diagnostics are employed.
INTRODUCTION

Military Threat of Arthropod-Borne Diseases
Arthropod-borne diseases have historically posed a significant threat to deployed military forces.'" The pathogens causing these diseases are transtnitted by a variety of biting arthropod.s, in include iiiostjiiitocs. licks, chiggers. sand nies, lice, fleas, and biting midges. Arthropod-borne diseases considered a significant threat to military forces include malaria/ dengue,""'-leishmaniasis,^''"'*' scrub typhus,'-'^ epidemic and endemic typhus.' " Crimean-Congo bemorrhagic fever (CCHF) virus, Rifi Valley fever (RVF) virus, Sindbis virus, sandfly fever viruses (SFV), Venezuelan equine encephalilis There is no objection to its preseniation and/or publication. The opinions or assenions contained herein are the private views of the author, and are not to be consinietl ¡is official, or as reHecting true views of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. One of tbe coauthors (Dr. Kirti Dave) bas an intere.st in a commercial company that produces and sells some of the band-held assays described in this article. This manu.script was received for review in January 2009. Tbe revised manuscript was accepted for publication in June 2(H)y.
(VEE) virus, tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) viruses. West Nile (WN) virus and Japanese encephalitis (JE) virus. A variety of additional arthropod-borne diseases could potentially impact military operations. A summary of some of tbe tnost significant arthropod-borne threat agents,' to include pathogen, primary reservoiris), and vectors, is presented in Table I .
Altbough vaccines and/or prophylactic drugs are the preferred method of protecting deployed military personnel from infectious diseases,'"^ these protective measures are not available tor many arthropod-borne diseases (Table I) . Currently, FDA-licensed vaccines tor widespread use are available for yellow fever virus, JE virus, and plague, while limited-use vaccines (normally restricted to individuals at high risk of infection) are available for VEB, RVF, CCHF, TBE, and eastern and western equine encephalitis (EEE and WEE) viruses. Prophylactic drugs are widely used for the prevention of malaria and less frequently for protection trom scrub lyphus and various rickettsial diseases, but provide no protection against the majority of atthropod-borne diseases (Table I) .
Requirement for Vector Diagnostics
In the absence of a vaccine or prophylactic drug, the most effective means of protecting deployed military personnel from arthropod-borne diseases is to prevent infected artbropods frt)tii biting them. Prevention of bites from infected arlhropods can be achieved through effective use of personal protective measures (PPMs) or by reducing vector populations. Effective PPMs include application of DEET-containing insect repellents to exposed skiti, wearing a permethrititreated uniform, and sleeping under an insecticide-treated bed net,"" '^'" while vector populations tnay be reduced by judiciously using insecticides or eliminating vector habitat.''"'' A key tenet of military vector control operations is that the goal is not to merely decrease vector populations but to actually Sixly percent {n = 24) ofthe top 40 infectious disease threats are primarily iranstiiitted by anhropods, while 4 additional diseases (bacterial atid prouv.oal diarrhea-causing agents, cholera, and Q fever) are occasionally transmitted by anhnipods. Only 11 (27.5%) of the ttip 40 threat agents have no anhroptid involvement. "Vaccines tiot approved for general use in the United States. ''Hand-held diagnostic assay for vector assessment eurrently under development. ' Real-time PCR assays fnr target ayen! exist: however, these assays may not have been fully validated wiih arthropod samples.
reduce transmission ofthe pathogen to deployed military personnel. To effectively reduce transmission it is critical that insecticides or other prevention/control measures be applied in areas where the risk is greatest. The riskof arlhropod-bornc disease transtnission is best expressed by the "entomological inoculation rale" (EIR). which is the number of infectious bites received per person per day in a given area. Key factors affecting the EIR are (i) the number of bites received per person per day and (ii) tbe proportion of arthropods that are infected and capable of transmittitig the pathogen.--' Although it is extremely difficult to determine tbe proportion of arthropods capable of transmitting a particular pathogen, methods of detertTiining whether an arthropod is infected have improved significantly and can greatly facilitate the estimation ofthe EIR.
Many arthropod-borne diseases are extremely fiK'al. The distribution of an arthropod-borne disease in a given environment is a reflection of many factors, to include proximity of the pathogen, reservoir and vector in time and space, and the presence of environmental conditions tbat facilitate rapid development of the pathogen in the vector and allow tbe vector to survive long enough to transmit the pathogen.-' "' The mere presence of a potential vector does not in itself indicate that there is a risk of disease. The term "anopbelistn without malaria" refers to tbe fact that Anopheles mosquitoes capable of transmitting tnalaria are found in many areas in which malatia transmission is rare or does not occur." For example, malaria-competent Anopheles vectors are found in most of North America and Europe yet locally transmitted malaria is essentially nonexistent in these regions.
A number of recent sttidies suggest that effective prevention and control of vector-borne diseases requires a targeted approach in which maximum resources arc committed to areas where the risk of acqtiiring the particular di.sease is bighest.-**'--^"* For example. Stnith et al." found that 20% of people received 80% of ail malaria infections in Africa and suggested tbat targeted control would prcnide a disproportionate impact and significant benefits., while Vanwambeke et al.''' felt tbat dengue control programs in Thailand needed to take into account the temporal and geographic focality of dengue to be truly effective.
Clearly, many factors affect tbc distribution of vectorborne diseases and the associated risk posed to deployed military forces. Likewi.se, many different methods can be used to assess potential risk. Presence or ab.sence of a key vector, abundance of tbe vector, and presence of patbogcn-specific antibodies in animal reservoirs or in people living in the area of operations can all provide useful information to help assess MIIJTARY MEDICINE, Vol. 174. September 2009 risk and facilitate the development of targeted control programs. With the emergence of tield-deployable diagnostic assays, early detection of the pathogen in vector populations has also emerged as an effective method of rapidly assessing risk.^'^" Ideally, detection of a vector-borne disease threat would occur before the occurrence of cases in deployed military personnel.'' thereby allowing for the early implementation of vector control measures and minimizing the impact of the disease on military operations.
Methods of Conducting Vector Diagnostics
Vector diagnostics is (he detection of disease-causing pathogens within the arthropod vector. One of the earliest methods of determining if an arthropod was infected was to visually examine appropriate organs (e.g.. the midgut or salivary glands of AnopheU'.s' mosquitoes for malaria parasites) under a microscope.'** This method is normally not appropriate for use during military operations as it is time consuming and requires a high level of training. The development of immunological methods in general, and the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) in particular, revolutionized the tield of vector diagnostics."'''^' The circumsporozoite protein ELISA for the detection of human malaria parasites in mosquitoes was hrsl developed at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WKAIR)and rapidly became the standard method for assessing mosquito infection rates.^""" ELISA assays are capable of testing large numbers of arthropods very rapidly; however, they are not routinely u.sed during military operations because of the amounl of equipment required, complexity, and the requirement for a cold chain.
The need for vector surveillance during military deployments led to the development of a series of hand-held immunochromatographic assays. These assays are simple, can he used anywhere, and do not require a cold chain, thereby overcoming most of the challenges associated with the use of ELISA assays. The malaria VecTest assay was developed through a collahoralive effort between Navix. Inc. (subsequently Medical Analysis Systems, Inc.) and the WRAIR. The assay detects Plasmodium falciparum and P. vivax circumsporozoite protein in anopheline mosquitoes and is sold as a kit containing 20 assays, with each assay capable of testing up to 20 mosquitoes in 15 minutes (Fig. 1) . Sensitivity ranges from 91 to liW/c and speciticity from 94 to 99.7%, on the basis of tield trials conducted in Africa. Asia, and South America.''^^' The malaria VecTest kit requires no refrigeration or free/ing and is stable up to 24 monihs at temperatures up to 32°C and for shorter periods at temperatures up to SO'C. The malaria VecTest kit has been assigned a national stock number (NSN: 6íi5()-0I-íi51-5327) and is currently available from VecTOR Test Systems. Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA.
Subsequent to the development of the malaria VecTest kit. the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the WRAIR, and Medical Analysis Systems. Inc. developed a series of five VecTest assay kits for the detection of arthropod-borne viru.ses. Each kit contains 50 assays, with each 
Rationale for This Study
Unlil recently, vector diagnostics had not been routinely used during military deployments. However, the development of hand held assays and real-time PCR assays that can be used ill a field environment resulted in the employment of both .systems during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by U.S. and German military forces. The goal of this article is to assess the use of these assays during OIF and OEF, to identify issues related to their use, and to make recommendations for future use.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Collection of Mosquitoes and Sand flies
Mosquitoes and sand flies were collected as part of a systematic effort by U.S. and German preventive medicine (PVNTMED) assets to assess vector populations in areas where military forces were located throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. Standardized guideline on collection procedures were provide to each PVNTMED unit that participated in this study. This effort was initiated in 2(X)3 and has continued to date (2009). Insect collections were primarily made using unbaited CDC miniature light traps; however. German PVNTMED personnel also collected Anopheles mosquitoes from inside of tents. buildings, and latrines using a commercially available handheld mouth aspirator with a hepa filter. Although a variety of individuals from a number of differenl unils were responsible for insect collections, the following procedures were generally used. Light traps were normally placed shortly before sunset and were retrieved soon after dawn. Traps were normally placed within I meter ofthe ground. Fine mesh collecting cups suitable for the collection of sand flies, mosquitoes, and other small insects were used with the light traps. Upon return to the field laboratory, collection cups were placed in a freezer to kill the collected insects. Mosquitoes collected using aspirators were placed in 1-pint screened cartons and returned to the field laboratory where they were killed by freezing at -20"C or using ethanol. Within 1-2 hours the collection cups were removed from the freezer, contents placed in a Petri dish, and mosquitoes and sand fiies separated from the remaining insects using a di.ssecting microscope. were identified to subfamily (Phlebotominae), while those collected in 2005 were identified to genus (Fhlehoiomus and Sergenîomyia) and those in 2(X)6 to species. Sand flies were stored frozen at -VO^C or in 80-l(X)'/f ethanol until tested. Mosquitoes were identified to genus,'" with all anopheline mosquitoes subsequently identified to species using the key of Glick et al.'' Female anopheline mosquitoes were either tested immediately with the malaria VecTest assay or were stored frozen at -70°C for testing at a later date.
Testing Anopheline Mosquitoes Using the Malaria VecTest Assay
Procedures described in the insert for the malaria VecTest kit were used. Ali supplies required for running the assay are provided with the kit (Fig. 1 ) . In brief, from I-10 anopheline mosquitoes were placed into a conical grinding tube and 13 drops of grinding solution dispen.sed into each tube. A grinding pestle was placed in each tube and rotated vigorously for approximately 1 minute or until ihe mosquitoes were thoroughly homogenized. A test strip was labeled and placed into the grinding tube containing the mosquito suspension. After 15 minutes the test strip was removed and results read immediately per the insert.
Testing Sand Flies Using Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction Assays
DNA E.\írmíiim U.S. units used the Qiagen QlAamp DNA Mini kit to extract DNA from pools of sand flies per procedures de.scribed in the product insert. German units homogenized sand flies mechanically using a Roche Diagnostics MagNA Lyser device and extracted DNA using a Roche Diagnostics High Pure PCR Template Preparation kit. Tubes containing extracted DNA were labeled and stored at 4X or -2O'C if PCR was lo be performed within 3 days or at -70°C if PCR was to be performed more than 3 days later,
Real-Time PCR Assays
Sand nies were initially tested using a ¿Í'/.V/Í/Í/Í/ÍÍ/VÍ-genus realtime (fluorogenic) PCR assay modified from an assay developed by Worimann et al,'*'' for testing of clinical samples. The assay was modified so that each reaction contained I puReTaq Ready-to-Go PCR bead, 6mM MgCl,. 800 nM of each primer (LEISLKLEISUI), 120nMofprobê(LEISPI),and2,0Mlof template DNA. The assay was established and validated at the WRAIR in 2001. Assay validation consisted of an evaluation of the limit of detection of the assay as well as sensitivity and specificity of the assay using cultured L. major, L. dottovani. Samples with a mean cycle threshold (Ct) value of 40 were considered negative, while samples with a tnean Ct value <4() were considered potentially positive and were retested at least one additional time. Samples testing positive the second time were considered "presumptive posilives," while samples testing negative the second time were tested a third time. Samples testing positive on this third test were considered "presumptive positives," while samples testing negative the third time were considered indeterminate (i.e., could not determine if they were trtte positives or true negatives). An algorithm for the determination of infectivity status is presented in Figute 2. 
Sequencing of Real-Time PCR Positive Samples
Procedures used for the sequencing of Leishmunia parasites consisted of (i) a conventional nested PCR reaction, (ii) sequencing of a fragment of the glucose-6-phosphateisomerase (GPI) gene, and ( iii ) phylogenetic analysis. Samples determined to be L. donovani-conycAex parasites by GPI sequencing were analyzed further to determine whether they were L. infantuni or L. donovuni. An approximately 600-bp region of the "Hyper" gene was used to differentiate between L. infaiitiim and L. donov¿ini^lh\s region possesses 4 substitution differences and one point deletion/insertion event Ihai differentiate between L. donovani and L. infantum/chagasi (J,K, Molton, unpublished data).
Standard PCR
A ."iftO-bp fragment of the GPI gene was selected as a target. A tirst rt)und PCR primer set and a second round nested PCR primer set were selected based on the only Leishmania GPI sequence (accession no. X78206) contained in GenBank at the time of the primer design. Each 25-|iL teaction contained one puReTaq Ready-to-Go PCR bead, 10 pmol of each primer, and 2 ¡lL of témplale DNA. either Leishimmia DNA as purified above or 2 |iL of the first round PCR reaction. Cycling conditions included an initial denaturation at 94°C for 2 minutes foilowed by 35 cycles of denaturation at 94"C for 30 seconds, annealing at 50°C for 30 seconds, extension at 72"C for 45 seconds, and a final extension at 72°C for 7 minutes. Reactions were petfortned using an MJ-Research PTC-100 Thermal Cycler. Apptopriate negative (water) and positive controls were included in all reaction sets. Positive samples were verified on a \.59c agarose gel containing ethidiuni bromide by visualization of a band of the expected size using a transilluminator.
DNA Sec¡uencinfí
In brief, procedures for sequencing were as follows. The PCR amplilicalion product remaining after gel electrophoresis was purified using the QIAquick PCR purification kit according to the manufacturer's instructions. Automated sequencing was performed using an ABI 3100 genetic analyzer and a Big-Dye vl.l or v3,l sequencing kit according to the manufacturer's instructions. Primer., excess nucleotides, and buffer were removed from tbe Big-Dye sequencing reaction by eluting the tiiatcriul from a Sepbadex G-30 colutnn equilibrated with water. Sequencing of the approximately 600-bp region o{ the "Hyper" gene was conducted using a BaseStation-U)0 Automated DNA Sequencer with accompanying BCS and Cartographer software,
Phyiogenetic Analysis
Sequences were aligned using the MegAlign program and sequence ends were trimmed to a uniform length, Phyiogenetic analyses of aligned sequences were performed using the CtustalW method''' witb a gap penalty of 15 and a gap length of 6.66. The phyiogenetic tree generated by MegAlign is a rooted tree with the number of substitution events indicated at ihe bottom of the tree. Bootstrap replication was used to evaluate the strength of the clustering analysis. Unknown sample sequences were compared to sequences determined for known culture isolates and to other sequences present in GenBank. (Table II) .
RESULTS
Evaluation ofAnopheline Mosquitoes for
Evaluation of Phiebotomine Sand Flies for Leishmania Parasites Iraq
United States PVNTMED units collected 148,096 sand flies in Iraq (Table III) . A total of 6,633 pools containing 57,696 sand nies were tested using the Lei.shniania-gsfím real-time PCR assay. Seven hundred twenty-seven pools initially tested positive for Leishmania parasites; however, after tctesting only 577 were considered true pt)sitives, with 150 pools considered indeterminate. Assuming that only one sand fly in eaeh pool was infected, tbe minimum field infection rate was 1.00% (Table HI) . Overall infection rates were almost identical for 2003 (1.15%) and 2004 (1.17%); however, infection rates in 2(X)5 (0.14%) were signilicantly lower (Pearson's X' test, p < 0.05) (Table III) . A summary of results for a variety of separate areas in Iraq is presented in Table IV . Over 55% of the sand Hies were collected from the vicinity of TAB; bowever, large (>I ,000) numbers were collected from 9 other sites in Iraq. Infection rates ranged frotn a low of 0% in several areas to a high ot 5.6% in Ashraf.
Afghani.Stan
United States and German PVNTMED units collected a total of 21,498 sand flies in Afghanistan, with 541 pools containing 3,094 sand dies tested for the presence of Leishnumia parasites using the Leishmiinia-gemis real-time PCR assay (Table  III ). Sixty pools initially tested positive for Le I.s h mania parasites; however, after extensive retesting only 43 pools were determined to be true positives, with 17 considered indeterminate (Table III) . The tninimum field infection rate was 1.39%. Eight PCR-positive pools collected by the German Bundeswehr were positive when subsequently tested using a L /íiíí7í;r-specific assay. A summary of results for a variety of areas in Afghanistan is presented in Table IV . Large f>l.(K>()) numbers of sand flies were only collected from Kandahar and Mazar-e Sharif. Infection rates ranged from a low of 0% in several areas to a bigh of 1.7% in Kandahar.
Sequencing of Leishmania
We sequenccd a 36()-bp region of the GPI gene from 731 pools of sand flies collected in Iraq and Afghanistan by U.S. PVNTMED units (Table V) and S .samples collected in Afghanistan by tbe German Bundeswehr. DNA from each of these pools had been previously extracted and assessed using the Lei.sluminiii-gcnus real-time PCR assay. These 739 pools included 570 of tbe 620 PCR-positive samples, 158 of the 167 (Table IV) . Eighteen oí these samples wereZ,. £/fjnov«/i/-complex parasites (with 12 of these identifled as L. infantum). 3 were L trópica, and 2 were similar to both L. trópica and L. major. Additional pathogenic samples included a L rrapica-positive sample from Camp Victory in Baghdad, a single L. infamum-posuiwe sample each from Babylon and from Diwaniyah. and a L major-pos\X\\e sample from Taji (Table IV) . Eight L. major-positive samples from Mazar-e Sharif were the only pathogenic Leishmania detected in sand flies collected in Afghanistan. This change in protocol resulted in several immediate observations. First, infection rates in Ser^entomyia .spp. sand flies were five times higher than in Phtehotomus spp. sand flies (Table VI) . Secondly. L tarentolae was commonly detected in both Phleholomiis and Seri^entomyia spp. sand flies, accounting for 11 of 12 of the Leishmania species identified from Phlehotonnts spp. sand flies and 13 of 13 of those identified from Sergentomyia spp, sand flies (Table VI) . No pathogenic Leishmania were detected in Sergentomyia spp. sand flies; however. L Í/ÍJ/JÍHÍ/ÍÍ/-complex parasites were detected in one p(K)l of Phlehotomu.s spp. sand flies. Although the number of samples collected and tested by German PVNTMED personnel was far lower than those tested by U.S. laboratories, the high proportion (H/32) o\ P. papatasi pools infected with L major was noteworthy, as was the 2.5% infection rate.
UseofVectorDiagno.stiis During; Military Deployments: Recent Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
Sorting of Sand Flies Before Testing
Reiationship Between Reai-Time PCR Ct Value and Sequencing Results
Because many samples were positive for Leishmania DNA by real-time PCR but were negative when sequenced, we compured real-titne PCR Ct values with sequeticitig results to determine whether there were any relationships between .strength of the PCR reaction and the proportion of samples determined to be Leishmania by sequencing (Table VII) . As the mean Ct values decreased (i,e., reaction became stronger), the proportion ol" samples that tested positive for Leishmania parasite GPI sequences increased while the proportion ol other GPI sequences decrea,sed. For example, 99% of the samples with a mean Ct value <26 matched known Leishmania spp. sequences, whereas only 3% of the samples with a mean Ct value between 38 and 39,99 matched any known Leishmania spp. sequence (Table VII) .
DISCUSSION
Evaluation of the Malaria VecTest Assay
In spite of an intensive surveillance effort, only 430 anopheline mosquitoes were ctillected in Iraq and all 191 that were tested using the mahu-ia VecTest assay were negative. In contrast. 1,595 anopheline mosquitoes were collected in Afghanistan, with a total of 35 pools infected with Phisnwdiitm vivax and 7 with /Í falcipartim. Although we were not able to determine whether any of the infected mosquitoes were capable of transmitting malaria. An. pulcherrimus. An. hrycanus, and An. superpictus are all known vectors of malaria in Southwest A.sia,''^'''^ These data suggest that malaria rates should bc much higher in service members deployed to Afghanistan compared to those deployed to Iraq, and that the majority of cases should he the result of infection with P. vivax. Unfortunately, the long incubation period of temperate-strain P. vivax,^^ combined with the mobility of U.S. military personnel makes it difficult to determine exactly where vjvax malaria infections were acquired," Although 60 soldiers who deployed to Iraq since 2003 have been diagnosed with malaria, only 7 individuals In Iraq during the transmission season had no other documented exposure, suggesting that most of these soldiers acquired their infections elsewhere."^ In contrast, significant numbers of military personnel appear to have been infected while in Afghanistan,'" Cimera and Brundage'" rept)rted that 74 military members with malaria had served in Afghanistan during the transmission season, with 41 (55%) having no other documented exposure risk, while Koiwal et al.' ' ** reported 38 active duty soldiers from a 725-man Ranger Task Force contracted malaria while operating in eastern Afghanistan in 2002.
Our data suggest that hand-held assays are a remarkably powerful tool with which to assess the threat of vector-borne diseases to deployed mililary forces. These assays can be used anywhere and can provide real-time feedback. These assays will be most valuable when used to assess the vector-borne disease threat immediately before or soon after moving military forces into a given area-the goal sbould be the detection of pathogens before the onset of disease in our deployed military forces. Early detection of a pathogen will allow for the implementation of pathogen/vector-specitic protective measures that can minimize casualties to our military forces. For example, useof the malaria VecTest assay in Afghanistan clearly demonstrated that infected anopheline mosquitoes were present-these positive assay results were extremely useful in obtaining command support for mandatory use of PPM. In contrast, all of the mosquitoes tested with this assay at TAB. Iraq were negative, suggesting that malaria was not present or was exceedingly rare at tbis site. Information on the scarcity of anopheline mosquitoes in most areas in Iraq combined wilh the negative malaria VecTest assay results helped medical authorities implement a policy in which mandatory malaria prophylaxis was discontinued. We believe that hand held vector assays are a valuable force multiplier and should play a key role in the Deployment Environmental Surveillance Program directed by the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM), (29) 8 (11) 1 (2) 1 (I) 364(50) "The Ct value is ihe numher i)t*cycles ai which (he sample wa.s considered positive. The lower the value the .stronger the reaction. A Ct value of 40 is considered negative. 'The dctcniiinaiion as to whether Uie sample was considered positive, negative, or indeterminate was based on reiesiing of the .sample as outlined in Figure 2 .
Hand-held vector assays should also be integrated into PVNTMED units of all services.
The malaria VectorTest (irademark of VecTOR Test Systems,, Inc.) assay and the various other VecTest (trademark of products from Medical Analysis System, Inc., now a part of ThermoFisher) assays for the detection ttf EEE. WEE. SLE, and WN viruses are currently the only hand-held assays available for vector surveillance during military deployments. A variety of additional VectorTest assays, to include assays tor the detection oí Leishnuinia parasites and dengue. RVE. JE. SFV. and Ross River viruses, are currently being developed and could potentially be fielded within the next several years. The ultimate goal is the Helding of hand-held vector assays for al! of the top threat agents identified in Table I ,
Evaluation of Real-Time PCR Assays for Leishmania Surveillance
In contrast to hand-held vector assays that can be used almost anywhere.^*^ real-time PCR assays normally require a power supply and a cold chain. In spite of these limitations, real-time PCR assays can be used under a variety of field conditions, to include tents and other portable structures. Although not as rapid as the hand-held assays, under optimal conditions DNA can be extracted and assay results obtained within several hours. We found that the Lei.shmania-genus real time PCR assay was a usetul tool that allowed us to screen hundreds of sand flies each day for Leishmania parasites. However, as with alt other tools, the limitations of the assay must be understood when interpreting results.
The high infection rates in sand flies collected in the vicinity of TAB and several other areas in Iraq suggested that service members stationed in these areas were at high risk of becoming infected with Leishmania (Table IV) . It was only once sequencing of the 360-bp region of the GPI gene had been completed that we were able to determine that the actual threat was much lower than originally suggested, since the nonpathogenic L. tarentolae accounted for the majority of ihc PCR-positive samples. Before our deployment to Iraq in 2003. there was little information available on the abundance of nonpathogenic Leishmania in sand flics in the Middle East. Although we realized that nonpathogenic species such as L. tarentolae, L. turanica. and L gerbilli were potentially present in Iraq, there was no published data that suggested nonpathogenic Leishmania were present or that they would account for over 90% of the PCR-positive samples from sand Hies. Unfortunately, lhe Leishmania-g^enus real-time PCR assay is not capable of differentiating pathogenic from nonpathogenic species.
Clearly, appropriate targets must be developed for assays that will be used in vector surveillance. Although a Leishmania-genus real-time PCR assay is acceptable for use with human samples, as any Leishmania detected in a human sample is intuitively pathogenic, our data demonstrate that a Z^íí/im£íHíV/-genus assay cannot be used independently to assess the medical threat posed by sand flies. Sequencing of appropriate targets (e.g., the GPI and "Hyper" genes a.s done in this study) can be used to identify the Leishmania species; however, sequencing is currently not possible in a field environment and can take several weeks. Assays that can differentiate pathogenic from nonpathogenic Leishmania are clearly needed, as are species-specilic assays. We have developed two assays specific for L. d<>novani-comp\cx parasites and one for L. tnajor and are currently developing assays for L. trapica and L tarcntolac. We have also developed an assay thai is specilic tor pathogenic Leishmaniu parasites of the Old World, to include L. trapica. L. majar, L aethiopica, and L. (/í)/jíMí//í/-coniplex parasites. This assay does not detect nonpathogenic species. Once fully validated, these assays will allow for a more rapid assessment of the medical threat posed by sand flies in the Middle East, In addition to requiring additional species-specific assays, it is critical thai the performance of each assay be well established before use in an operational setting. Procedures used to validate initial test results should be established, as should a rubric for identifying the causative agent. At the onset of OIF. we had completed initial validation of the Leishmania-gcnu's assay using laboratory-infected sand flies and had calculated the limit of detection for L. majar. We had also developed assays specific for L major, L ¡mpica, and L. donovanicomplex parasites; however, we had not yet fully validated these assays. Although we knew that these species-specitic assays were approximately 10 times less sensitive than the Leislvnania-genus assay, we had not determined the limit of detection for each assay nor had we evaluated cross-reactivity of the assays. Initially, all samples that tested positive with the Leishmania-gem\s assay were subsequently tested using lhe L. major, L. trópica, and L. dana\ani'<¿om\')\e\ assays. Over 90% of the samples testing positive using the Leishmaniagenus assay were negative with the species-specific assays. Because of our incomplete understanding of llie performance of each assay, we were not able to determine whether the species-speciflc assays were negative because (i) they were less sensitive than the Leishmania-^cnus assay, (ii) the Leishmaniagenus assay was yielding false positive results, or (iii) the U'ishmania-genus assay was detecting a species of parasite not recognized by the species-specific assays, The development of a testing algorithm (Fig. 2) that included multiple retesting using real-time PCR and sequencing of a poiiion of the GPI gene was an attempt to overcome these limitations.
When using real-time PCR assays it is also important to establish realistic cut-off values that can be used to determine whether samples arc positive, negative, or indeterminate. When establishing the Leishmania-genxxs PCR assay at WRAIR. our laboratory data suggested that all Ct values <40 should bc considered positive. However, when our field data were carefully analyzed (Table VII) to include the use of sequencing in our testing paradigm, it became clear that it was necessary to establish an indeterminate range (i.e.. not possible to determine if the result was a true positive or a true negative). Retesting of samples that initially tested positive with the real-time PCR assay suggested that an appropriate cut-off might be at a Ct of 38. as only 5% of samples with a Ct between 38 and 39.99 were positive uptin retesting, whereas 78% of samples with a Ct between 36 and 37.99 tested positive upon retesting (Table VII) , Although sequencing proved to be a useful tool for conñrming the identify of parasites, it was difhcull lo determine if a negative sequencing result meant that the original PCR assay result was a false positive or whether the large number of PCR-posilive samples that were negative by sequencing reflected limitations ol our sequencing procedures. Our results clearly indicate that coniirmatory assays are a key component of any testing program. Ideally, any conrtrmatory assay should have a limit of detection similar to or below that of the screening assay and should target a separate genomic region of the target pathogen.
In addition to retining our test procedures as a means of conclusively identifying Leishmania parasites in sand Mies, we also attempted to determine whether sorting sand flies to genus and/or species could eliminate the nonpathogenic Leishmania. Since Sergentomyia spp. sand flies are believed to be the vectors of Sauroleishmania (e,g., L. tarentolae),^^ we hoped that by focusing testing on Phlehotomus spp. sand flies we would reduce or eliminate positive .samples resuliing from detection of nonpathogenic species of Leishmania. Although Leishmania parasites were detected in Sergentomyia spp, sand Hies much more frequently than in the Phlehotomus spp. sand flies, L tarentolae nevertheless accounted for 92% (11/12} of the Leislimania samples detected in Phlehotomus spp. sand flies. We were not able lo determine whether the Phlebotomus spp, sand flies were capable of transmitting L. tarentolae, however, these data clearly demonstrated thai sorting of sand Hies to genus will not eliminate the detection of nonpathogenic Leishmania.
To dale, only three military personnel deployed to Iraq since 2003 have developed visceral leishmaniasis. However, our data demonstrate that parasites that cause visceral leishmaniasis posed a threat to military personnel in Iraq in 2(K)3 and 2(M)4, The fact that more symptomatic cases have not yet occurred in deployed military personnel is not unexpected as visceral leishmaniasis caused by L infantum has historically been considered a disease of young chiidren who are malnourished and/or immunocompromised.'''' Among residents in the Mediierranean basin, symptomatic visceral leishmaniasis in adults is almost exclusively a result of concomitant infection with L. infantum and human immunodeficiency virus,^^™ The fact that deployed military personnel are presumably healthy, well-fed, immune-competent adults suggests that the risk of developing symptomatic visceral leishmaniasis resulting from infection with L. infantum is low; however, there may be potential long-term concerns involving the disease. Leishmania parasites can persist In the body for life, even following successful treatment of symptomatic individuals.^' and asymptomatic carriers can become symptomatic following suppression of their immune system.^" Although the exact tiimiber of military personnel actually exposed to parasites that cause visceral leishmaniasis may never be detennined, as there are currently no FDA-licensed tests that can be used to assess exposure, our data clearly demonstrate that sand Hies infected with L. infantum were present in areas where U.S, military personnel were stationed.
Concept of Operations for Vector Diagnostics
Vector diagnostics provides deployed military forces with a powerful tool to assess the threat from vector-borne diseases. Vector diagnostics is not a stand-alone process, but rather is part of an integrated prevention effort consisting of (i) vector surveillance, (ii) vector identification, (iii) vector diagnostics. (iv) individual protective measures, and (v) collective protective measures. When this integrated prevention process is effectively implemented it can result in a rapid assessment of the vector-borne disease threat and assist in the establishment of disease prevention programs, such as the "Leishmaniasis Control Program" established at TAB, Iraq in 2003." The development of diagnostic procedures for identifying pathogens in arthropods has lagged far behind the other four steps in this process. However, technological advances since the early 1990s have led to the creation of diagnostic tools that allow trained personnel to identify pathogens in arthrt)pods in a rapid and efficient manner. The following is our proposed concept of operations (CONOPS) for the use of vector diagnostics:
As.say s Used
We propose a two-tiered system for use by deployed military forces, with more extensive capabilities available in fixed medical facilities such as the WRAIR or USACHPPM, In this two-tiered system, hand-held immunochromatographic assays are used as screening tools and real-time PCR assays are used as confirmatory tools. The hand-held assays will ideally target a broad range of pathogens (e.g., genus-level assays), while each real-time PCR assay would ideally target a single pathogen (e,g,, species-level assays). For example, a Leishmaniagenus hand-held screening assay could be complemented by real-time PCR assays specific for L. major, L. trópica, and L i/i?niiV£ï«/-complex parasites. Confirmatory assays sht)uld consist of two real-time PCR assays that recognize two separate targets on different genes for each pathogen of interest. Currently, very few hand-held or real-time PCR assays are available for vector diagnostics (Table I) Fixed facilities such as the WRAIR and the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRllD) possess a variety of more sophisticated diagnostic capabilities that would not normally be available to deployed forces, to include procedures such as sequencing of genomic material and culturing and subsequent identification of pathogenic agents. These fixed facilities are a valuable resource that can facilitate the iderttitícation of vector-borne pathogens.
The Armed Forces Pest Management Board (www.afpmb. org) maintains a database that Msts a variety of vector assays that have been developed by various military laboratories and the CDC. The intent of this spreadsheet is to provide potential users with a list of assays that may be used to support their individual requirements. Inclusion of a specific assay in this spreadsheet does not imply that the assay has been endorsed by the AFPMB except where noted.
Assay Validation
If possible, all assays used during military deployments should be fully validated for all target organisms. Standard performance criteria should be calculated for each assay, to include litnit-of-detection, sensitivity, specificity, and positive-and negative-predictive value, ideally, performance should be evaluated using infected arthropods. Unfortunately. the challenges associated with obtaining infected arthropods will frequently preclude comprehensive evaluation of assay performance. In these Instances, it is critical that the limitations ofthe assay be fully understood and that these limitations be considered when interpreting assay results.
Usiti^ Vector Diagnostics
Hand-held assays are primarily used by units actually conducting vector surveillance operations, such as the PVNTMED Section of a Brigade Combat Team or an Army PVNTMED Detachment. These units will normally not be equipped with real-titiie PCR assays and will therefore need to ship specimens to a medical laboratory for confirmatory testing. Real-titne PCR assays are primarily used by units with sophisticated laboratory capabilities beyond those found in a Brigade Combat Team or Army PVNTMED Detachtnent, Units with real-time PCR capabilities include Army Area Medical Laboratories, Navy Eorward Deployed PVNTMED Units, and Air Eorce Biological Assesstnent Teams, among others. Although these sophisticated laboratories may on occasion conduct vector surveillance operations, their primary mission is testing environmental samples to assess the medical threat to deployed forces. Therefore, in most instances samples will be shipped to these laboratories by the units actually conducting vector surveillance operations.
Collection of Arthropods
A variety of procedures may be used to collect arthropods that will subsequently be tested for the presence of pathogens. The collection pnx'edure .should not interfere with the diagnostic assay to be performed. Although the tiiajority of collection procedures will not interfere with diagnostic procedures, some procedures (e.g.. sticky traps) could potentially interfere and should not be used unless proven to be compatible with diagnostic procedures. Standardized sampling procedures should be used whenever possible, with guidance on procedures provided before the onset of sampling. The type of trap used.
height of trap, period of trap placement, and numbers and locations of traps should all be standardized, as should the use of attractants such as dry ice or compres.sed carbon dioxide. Data collection begins at this step and the collectors tnust enter and maintain the data in electronic or written form so that this information can be forwarded with and linked to the samples. Basic data should include location, date/time, collector's name, collection method, and habitat information. Other parameters can be added to the data set as needed by the study design.
Killing, Preserving, and Storing Arthropods
The procedure used to kill, preserve., and store collected anhropods should not interfere with the diagnostic assay that will subsequently be perfortiied. Acceptable methods of killing arthropods include freezitig or immersion in ethanol. While a variety of addititinal methods (e.g.. heat or use t)f chemicals such as ethyl acetate or potassium cyanide) are frequently used to kill collected arthropods, further studies are needed to ensure that these procedures are ccMnpatible with each diagnostic procedure to be used. Each diagnostic assay should provide detailed infonnation on how specimens should be stored before testing. In general, specimens should be tested immediately or stored frozen at -2Ü'C or colder {-l(fC is preferable if samples will be stored for months or years before testing) or in 9()-IOOÇ'r ethanol. A variety of additional storage methods may be compatible with test procedures: however, these storage procedures should not be used unless empirical data detiionstrate that they will not adversely affect the petfortnance ofthe diagnostic procedure. Unnecessary free/.e-thaw cycles should be minimized as this can affect assay results.
Pooling Specimens
In an unconstrained environtnent, each anhropod collected would be tested individually; however, because of cost and time this is rarely feasible. Instead, groups of "like" specimens are normally combined into pools of 5-50 individuals and the pools tested. Whenever possible, anhropods in a single pool should come from a single collection made at a particular site and at a panicular time. For example, arthropods in a given pool would come from a single light trap collection made on a single night, in many cases, the specimens are placed into pools during the sorting process to facilitate future specimen testing.
Labeling Samples
Each sample (e.g.. vial containing whole arthropods, homogenized arthropods, or DNA/RNA extracts) should receive a unique identifier that allows that particular sample to be linked to the collection data. Identifiers should be written directly on vials using a permanent, water/ethanol resistant marker (tr using preprinted labels intended for use with cryovials.
Hcmogenizcition/Extraciion Procedures
A variety of procedures may be used for the homogenization of samples and/or the extraction of DNA or RNA. Anhropods MILITARY MEDICINE, Vo], 174. September 2(K)9
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tested using hand-held VecTest assays are homogenized in a grinding buffer using a small mortar and pestle provided with Ihc kii. wiih the dipstick placed directly into the honiogcnate. Samples lo be tested using real-time PCR assays are homogenized and then DNA or RNA are extracted using a variety of different protocols. Safety issues related to homogenization procedures are discussed further in the biological safety section.
Assay Protocols
Each assay used for vector diagnostics should include a detailed protocol specifying procedures to he used and limitations of the assay. A point-of-contact (telephone numher and e-mail address) should be provided so that questions regarding the assay can he rapidly addressed. Whenever possihle. il given surveillance program should be directed hy a central coordinating agency (e.g.. USACHPPM) so that protocols can be implemented consistently and data from different sites compared to one another.
Use of Multiple Test Procedures
Although most samples will he tested using only a single procedure, in some instances additional diagnostic testing may be required. Reasons for conducting additional testing include contirmalion of the identity of a positive sample or testing for additional pathogens. In all instances where muiliple test procedures may be used, a protocol should be established thai will allow for subsequent testing of samples. For example, samples that are stored in cthanol cannot subsequently be used to culture viable patliogcns. while the grinding buffer used in certain assays may be incompatible with other test procedures.
Interpretation of Results
All test results, whether positive or negative, should he recorded. Negative test results have limited value, particularly when a small number of samples have been evaluated. Negative results do not indicate that the specific pathogen is not present, but rather that the pathogen was not detected in the satiiple population. Although a comprehensive surveillance program would ideally collect periodic samples from a variety of sites over the course of a transmission season, in many instances samples are collected from a limited number of sites over a short period of time. In these instances negative test results may he the result of surveillance that misses key sites or surveillance conducted at a time when infected arthropods were not present. Although the value of negative test results increase as the sample si/e increases, it is difficult to estimate a minimum nitmber of negative samples required to assure a high degree of confidence that a particular pathogen has a low or nonexistent threat hecause many factors affect the efficiency of pathogen transmission.
Positive samples are much more valuable than negative samples, as they indicate that a particular pathogen was present at a certain location on a certain date. Positive samples can be used to calculate minimum field infection rates that can provide a rough estimate of the magnitude of the threat. However, as described in this article, care must be used when interpreting positive assay results, as the organism detected may not he pathogenic to humans, the vector may not be infectious, or the vector may not feed on humans.
Rcportini; of Test Results
Standardized form.s should be used for recording and reporting diagnostic assay results. These forms will ideally he prepared hy a single organization such as the USACHPPM and reviewed and approved by the AFPMB. Copies of all data and reports should be provided to the organization that collected the samples and to a single organization that will archive the data. Summaries of data should be prt)vided to all organisations with an inherent interest in vector diagnostic test results, to include the National Center for Medical Intelligence (formerly the Armed Ft)rces Medical Intelligence Center), the AFPMB, the USACHPPM. and through the medical chain-ofcommand to the Combatant Commands Surgeon's office.
Biological Safety Considerations
The use of vector diagnostics poses a potential risk to personnel conducting the testing. The primaiy risk is exposure to aerosolized pathogens during homogeni/ation of the arthropods. Although to our knowledge no disease transmission has ever occurred during processing of field-collected arthropods for vector diagnostics, the CDC publication "Biosafcty in microbiological and biomédical laboratories" has documented 151 instances in which a laboratory worker was infected with an arthropod borne virus-the majority of these infections are believed to have resulted from aerosol i zation of the virus.'-Although no specific guidelines for the handling of fieldcollected arthropods are available, the CDC recommends that Biosafety Level 2 practices be used for processing fieldcollected mosquito pools for West Nile virus.^^ In the absenee of specific Department of Defense (DoD) or Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) guidelines on the handling of field-collected arthropods, whenever possible arthropods should be hotnogenized in a sealed tube containing a grinding medium or diluent that will inactivate arboviruses and other easily aerosolized pathogens.^"* Unfortunately, the use of diluents that inactivate pathogens may preclude the use of these samples with some diagnostic assays.
Transport of Specimens
The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 49 is the document that governs the transportation of hazardous materials, to include infectious substances. Detailed information on the shipment of diagnostic specimens can be found in the USACHPPM fact sheet "Packaging hospital samples and specimens for transport" (http://chppm-www.apgea.army. mil/hmwp/Factsheets/Transport Summary.htm). Arthropods, to include homogenized samples and/or DNA/RNA extracts, are considered general diagnostic specimens unless a specific pathogen has been identified or is suspected. Regulations pertaining to the air shipment of general diagnostic specimens include 9 CFR (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service), 21 CFR (Food and Drug Administration), and 42 CFR (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), To ensure that proper protection is in place to contain any undetected pathogenic micro-organisms, general diagnostic specimens should be packaged in accordance with International Air Transportation Association (lATA) Dangerous Goods regulations. In general, procedures for packing general diagnostic specimens for air shipment include (i) sample placed in a primary watertight receptacle with a leakproof seal, (ii) watertight receptacle wrapped in absorbent material, (iii) wrapped container placed in a secondary watertight receptacle, (iv) the entire package is placed in a strong outer packaging approved by the U.S, Department of Transportation (DOT) for transport ofthe hazardous material, (v) itemized list describing content.s placed in the unsealed shipping box. and (vi) designated certifying oflicial approves package for transport. If needed, ice, dry ice. or prefrozen packs should be placed between the secondary watertight receptacle and the outer packaging. Packages containing dry ice must permit the release of carbon dioxide.
Diagnostic samples in which an infectious agent has been detected are no longer considered general diagnostic samples but rather are considered infectious substances. Infectious substances are defined as "a viable micro-organism, or its toxin, that causes or may cause disease in humans or animals, and includes those agents listed in 42 CFR 72.3 ofthe regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services or any other agent that causes or may cau.se severe., disabling or fata! disease." Very stringent regulations pertain to the shipment of infectious substances, with requirements described in detail in 49 CFR Part 173,196, The shipment of infectious substances requires coordinated action by the shipper, the transporter, and the receiver to ensure safe transport and arrival on time. Based on the detinition of infectious substances as a "viable micro-organism," diagnostic samples containing a pathogen inactivated using appropriate grinding media or diluent are considered genera! diagnostic samples and not infectious substances. As such, the less stringent procedures pertaining to the shipment of general diagnostic samples apply. Depending on the type of samples (e.g.. dead arthropods, general diagnostic sample, or infectious substances), appropriate CDC or U.S, Department of Agriculture (USDA) permits may be required to ship samples to the United States,
Biological Select Agents and Toxins
Certain microbial pathogens and toxins that potentially pose a severe threat to human, animal, or plant health are referred (o as biological select agents and toxins (BSATs A number of BSATs are transmitted by arthropods, to include African swine fever, bluetongue. CCHF, EEE, JE. RVF, TBE, and VEE viruses, as well as Rickettsiaprowazekii, R. rickettsii, FranciscUa lidarensis, and Yersinia pestis. Each of these pathogens could potentially be detected in arthropods during military deployments. Because of the severe threat posed by BSATs. the handling, transport, security, destruction, and reporting of Ihese agents are highly regulated. While the various regulations provide clear guidance on procedures used within the United States, tbere is little guidance on the detection and identification of BSATs in vectors during military deployments. Accepted practice during military deployments is to implement procedures that best meet the intent of relevant U.S, BSAT laws and regulations.
A key issue during military deployments is to determine whether a diagnostic sample should be considered a BSAT, as determination that a sample is a BSAT triggers a variety of specific actions/responses. In general, diagnostic samples are only considered to contain BSATs once a viable pathogen has been identified using a confirmatory assay (42 CFR 73), As described previously, a true confirmatory assay should consist of two separate, validated tests thai detect different targets on different genes, Tbere are currently no field-deployable vector assays that meet this requirement; therefore, vector samples are normally considered "presumptive positives" and would not be considered BSATs. However, the future development and fielding of true confirmatory assays could potentially result in vector .samples being classified as BSAT. An additional issue is the fad tbat procedures u.sed to prepare samples for both screening and confirmatory diagnostic assays frequently inactivate any pathogens that are present, so that even tbough a confirmatory assay identified a particular pathogen, tbat sample would not be considered BSAT as no viable pathogen is present. However, laboratory personnel should use caution when making a determination that a positive sample is not a BSAT. as it is extremely ditficult in a field setting to determine whether a viable pathogen is present. Additionally, any portion of the diagnostic sample that did not undergo nucleic acid extraction or other sterilizing procedures that would have inactivated the infectious virus may still contain viable BSATs (if identified by a confirmatory assay) and should be destroyed within 7 days as specified in 42 CFR 73. To further complicate matters, nucleic acid from positive-stranded RNA viruses can be used to produce infectious virus-this materiai would be considered a BSAT if detected using a confirmatory assay.
Clearly, personnel conducting diagnostic testing for BSATs should understand the rules and regulations pertaining to BSATs. Criteria for determining whether a sample contains a BSAT should be established, as should procedures for securing, transporting, and destroying these samples per Army. DoD. and U.S. laws and regulations. Personnel conducting diagnostic testing must also understand thai samples that do nol meet lhe strict definition of a BSAT may still pose a considerable threat to anyone exposed to these samples. For example, a sample that tests positive for RVF vims using a hand-held screening assay is not considered a BSAT; however, a potentially lethal virus may still be present in the sample if the grinding diluent does not completely inactivate the pathogen.
SUMMARY
Vector diagnostics arc a powerful tool thai can greatly facilitate the assessment of the threat posed by arthropod-borne diseases. In the absence of appropriate vaccines or prophylactic drugs, appropriately used vector diagnostics can provide an early warning system that can be used to mitigate the threat of vector-borne diseases. The goal of the diagnostics effort described in this article was to provide the various PVNTMED units stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan with information on the vector-borne disease threat in their respective areas of operation. These PVNTMED units were carrying out vector control operations on a routine basis, and we believed that lhe rapid evaluation of mosquitoes and sand flies for the presence of Plasmodium and Leishmania parasites, respectively, and the dissemination of results would allow the PVNTMED units to more effectively develop control programs that focused on areas that were at greatest risk for disease transmission. During OIF. implementation of a vector diagnostics program during the weeks following the invasion of Iraq resulted in the determination that leishmaniasis posed a significant threat to coalition military forces.''' This determination was made before the detection of any human cases and resulted in the aggressive implementation of prevention and control measures. Unfortunately, the diagnostic assays that were used did not adequately differentiate pathogenic from nonpathogenic Leishmania, resulting in an overestimate of the risk posed to deployed military torces. Nevertheless, we believe that the sand fly surveillance program provided valuable information that raised the awareness of the leishmaniasis threat to deployed military forces in bolh Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the USACHPPM continues to test sand flies collected in iraq and Afghanistan for Leishmania parasites, and the WRAIR and other organization such as the Air Force In.stitute for Operational Health continue to develop improved diagnostic assays for vector surveillance.
